Abstract: Platform monopoly exacerbates profit distribution imbalance and distorts the labor income share of platform firms. This study examines whether antitrust regulation in the platform economy can improve labor-capital income distribution and advance common prosperity. Using the 2021 Guidelines of the State Council Anti-Monopoly Commission on Anti-Monopoly in the Platform Economy as a quasi-natural experiment, we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) approach with Chinese A-share listed firms over 2016 to 2024. Results show that platform antitrust significantly increases firms’ labor income share. The effects operate through three channels: strengthening market competition, optimizing data utilization, and enhancing innovation performance. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the policy impact is stronger for firms with lower industry uncertainty, higher data asset disclosure, and tighter financing constraints. Further analysis reveals that antitrust curbs excessive executive compensation, raises ordinary employee wages, and narrows internal pay gaps. These findings provide empirical implications for regulating platform economy, optimizing income distribution, and promoting common prosperity.
Keywords: Platform Economy; Antitrust; Labor Income Share; Platform Firms; Common Prosperity; Platform Workers



